Local Approaches to Prevent and Counter Extremism

Berlin 21 May

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- Key-note speech on "POLICY PAPER Developing a local prevent framework and guiding principles - Part 2" by Filip Ahlin (SE)
- Expert panel:
  - Werner Prinzjakowitsch, COO at Viennese Youth Centres(AT)/ co-chair RAN YF&C.
  - Annemieke Brons, Dutch National Police, Unit The Hague (NL)
  - Anissa Akhandaf, Project Manager Prevention Violent Extremism City of Antwerp (BE)
- Closing remarks by Judy Korn, founder Violence Prevention Network/ co-chair RAN Exit

Aufgaben Radicalisation Awareness Network

1. Vereinfachung des Austauschs von Informationen und Erfahrungen von Praktikern

- **Voneinander lernen**
- **Bewährte Praktiken finden**

2. Politische Empfehlungen für die Europäische Kommission, aus der Praxis vor Ort

RAN Netzwerk der Netzwerke

Communication & Narratives

Police & Law enforcement

Chairs SC

Key stakeholder

Europäische Kommission (DG HOME

Tasks CoE

Exit

Steering Committee (RAN SC)

Health & Social Care

Andere Interessengruppen

Politik
Andere GDs
Andere EU-Institutionen
MS
Drittländer

Local Authorities

Centre of Excellence (RAN CoE)

Youth, Families & Communities

Education

Redaktionsausschuss Expertenpool

Akademiker
Zentren/ Netzwerke
Universitäten

Prison & Probation

Remembrance of Victims

Öffentlichheit
Gefährdete Personen
Gefährdete Gemeinschaften
Allgemeine Öffentlichkeit / Medien

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Was ist die RAN „DNA"?

- Prozess, einzigartige Prozesse
- Notwendigkeit, Rekrutierung und Ausnutzung von beeinflussbaren/gefährdeten Personen zu verhindern
- Multi-agency
- Situationsgeeignet

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Filip Ahlin

Developing a local prevent framework and guiding principles

Berlin, May 2019

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Centre of Excellence

RAN POLICY PAPER
November 2016

RAN POLICY PAPER

Developing a local prevent framework and guiding principles

Introduction

Tackling radicalisation and preventing violent extremism is a major challenge for safeguarding security and democratic values. It is one of the pillars of the EU's counter terrorism policy and increasingly a priority for the EU, national governments and local authorities, especially in the aftermath of successive terrorist atrocities, the scale of radicalisation and the resultant increasing polarisation within our societies.

In particular, the scale and scope of the foreign terrorist fighter issue with several thousand men, women and children travelling to join ISIL represent an unprecedented security challenge. The impending collapse of ISIL governance in the so-called Caliphate raises the prospect of foreign terrorist fighter return to their countries of origin within the EU. ISIL-directed or inspired terrorist atrocities within several EU Member States are designed to sow fear, panic and societal division which extremists can exploit to mobilise further support for their cause.

In addition to strengthened cooperation and targeted interventions in the security field, enhanced efforts are needed on early detection of radicalisation and the prevention of violent extremism (CVE/PVE) at the local level.

Confronting the challenges of radicalisation and violent extremism requires a sense of collective responsibility and ownership across national and local government levels. It requires close-knit collaboration between

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This paper is written by **Magnus Ranstorp**, RAN CoE. It is based on reflections by local prevent coordinators and frontline practitioners representing over 20 cities across Europe. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission or any other institution, or the official views of the participant municipalities and their local coordinators or fieldworkers.

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RAN POLICY PAPER
November 2018

RAN POLICY PAPER

Developing a local prevent framework and guiding principles - Part 2

Introduction

Tackling radicalisation and preventing violent extremism is a major challenge that must be addressed if we are to safeguard security and democratic values. It is one of the pillars of the EU's counter-terrorism policy and increasingly a priority for the EU, for national governments and for local authorities. This is especially the case in the aftermath of recent terrorist attacks, and in the light of increasing polarisation and radicalisation. The scale and scope of the foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon, with several thousand men, women and children travelling to join ISIL, represents an unprecedented security challenge. Now there is the prospect of foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin, or traveling to destinations of their choice within the EU. Terrorist attacks within several EU Member States are designed to sow fear, panic and societal division which extremists can exploit to mobilise further support for their cause.

Preventing violent extremism at the local level is crucial. This paper builds on the insights of and complements the RAN paper *Developing a local prevent framework and guiding principles* published in November 2016 by adding information from cities rather than replacing recommendations. Cities participating with select guidance include: Vienna, Vilvorde, Antwerp, Aarhus, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Strasbourg, Augsburg, Düsseldorf, Hesse, Rotterdam, Zoetermer, Delft, The Hague, Oslo, Larvik, Fredrikstad, Larvik, Gothenburg, Malmö, Örebro, Leceister and others involving the Nordic Safe Cities initiative.

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Radicalisation Awareness Network

- Chapter 1: Establishing an action plan or strategy
- Chapter 2: Creating a multi-agency structure
- Chapter 3: Contact & advisory point (hotline/helpline)
- Chapter 4: Role of mentors
- Chapter 5: Role of mental health
- Chapter 6: Family support and interventions models
- Chapter 7: Reintegration (after prison)
- Chapter 8: Social media
- Chapter 9: Engaging with communities & civil society

Radicalisation Awareness Network

- **Chapter 1: Establishing an action plan or strategy**
- **Chapter 2: Creating a multi-agency structure**
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- Chapter 8: Social media
- Chapter 9: Engaging with communities & civil society

Establishing an action plan or strategy

- Local coordinator
- Definitions
- Existing structures
- Situational awareness
- Local risk factors

- Ex. Structure:
  - Executive summary
  - Current extremist situation and reporting
  - Background
  - Schematic of measures
    - Measures
    - Responsibility for delivery
    - Collaboration partners
    - Period of intervention
    - Follow up and evaluation

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Mapping local risk factors

Mapping local risk factors

This framework provides elements needed for an analysis of the dynamic risk factors in local neighborhood

Societal
- Socio-economic factors
- Psychosocial factors
- Normative factors

Individual
- Norm-breaking / Anti-social
- Criminal behaviour

Violence-based conflicts
- Gang violence
- Honor-based revenge
- Rioting/social unrest

Socioeconomic factors
- Educational level
- Unemployment
- Limited financial resources
- Crowded housing conditions
- Stigmatisation
- Social welfare claimant
- Economic segregation
- Political marginalization
- Societal disorganization
- Low access to ordinary systems
- Health levels

Psychosocial factors
- Identity
- Migration
- Foreigness
- Psychosocial health
- Experience of violence
- Anomi

Normative influencing factors
- Criminal systems
- Clan-based structures
- Customary law
- Religious-based systems
- Structural violence

Source. Maria Wallin, Gothenburg 2014

Kaledioscope of risk-protective and promotive factors

Kaleidoscope of risk-protective- and promotive factors

A RAN Issue paper on root causes identified nine thematic risk factors interacting like a kaleidoscope:

- individual social-psychological (1) such as anger and a sense of injustice;
- social factors (2) as marginalization and discrimination;
- political (3) creating a narrative of 'us versus them';
- ideological factors (4) such as a salafi-jihadi interpretation of Islam and dissatisfaction with foreign policies;
- culture and identity crises (5) reinforced by standing between cultures;
- psychological trauma (6) such as PTSD;
- group dynamics (7) such a friends who are active in a violent extremist network;
- recruitment strategies consisting of groomers (8);
- social media (9)

Another RAN issue paper on protective and promotive factors mapped out these according to the nine thematic themes (in graph) providing an overview of intervention areas.

Establishing an action plan or strategy

- Local coordinator
- Definitions
- Existing structures
- Situational awareness
- Local risk factors
- Risk of stigmatising

- Ex. Structure:
  - Executive summary
  - Current extremist situation and reporting
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Creating a multi-agency structure

Political

Legal

Organisational

Role of mental health

Antisocial personality problems

Often individuals drawn towards violent extremism suffer from a combination of complex socio-psychological problems such as:

- Lack of empathy
- Risk-taking behavior
- Excitement seeker
- Lack problem-solving skills

- Masculinity norms
- Centrality of violence
- Poor social skills
- Lack critical thinking skills
- Low impulse control

Socio-psychological pathways into extremism

Four pathways
- Action-oriented personality → Ideology legitimizes violence
- Brooder → Cognitive opening & frame alignment
- Contact seeker → Sense of belonging
- Family way → Expectation and peer-pressure

Source: Swedish Security Service, 2010

Family support and intervention models

Challenges

Dealing with siblings require family consent or proof of child endangerment

Families do not know where to turn for support

Mistrust between families in family-support groups

Families may cover up their child's involvement

Negative spiral of trust between authorities and families

Families may fear their child may be removed by child protection services

Families may be radicalised themselves

Families may refuse to cooperate with the authorities

Family support and intervention models

- First one to discover
- Strong source – good and bad
- Key principles:
    - Customized approach
    - Information sharing
    - Contact persons
    - Support networks
    - No one-size fit all
    - Religious and cultural backgrounds

Challenges

Prisons are 'places of vulnerability' and radicalised individuals tend to interpret every perceived injustice and all experiences of powerlessness or humiliation as confirmation of their ideology and their concept of the enemy. This can affect rehabilitation efforts beyond the period of incarceration.

Local authorities may be surprised by the release of prisoner. The release can create significant turbulence in local milieus among criminal gangs and extremists.

It may be challenging to get prisons, police and local municipality systems to work together. It is not always possible to share sufficient information between prison rehabilitation and local authorities.

There is a crucial phase of vulnerability after release. Old group structures and peer pressure

Risk of individual moving somewhere else (outside municipal jurisdiction) upon release.

Reintegration (after prison)

- Key guiding principles:
    - Use existing exit-programs
    - Mentors
    - Mental health treatment
    - Local network
    - Immediately contact
    - Activities
    - Social dimension

Thank you!

filip.ahlin@fhs.se

Werner Prinzjakowitsch

COO at Viennese Youth Centres(AT)/ co-chair RAN YF&C

The Association Of Viennese Youth Centres Non-Profit Organisation

RAN – Radicalisation Awareness Network European Union

Where is your Multi-Agency Work located ?

- Level of Prevention

- How your country is organised

- Level of hierarchy

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WIENER JUGENDZENTREN

Level

Generic

Indicated

Targeted

Tertiary

Secondary

Primary

Country

- Centralised – Decentralised

- Who is responsible for which services?

- Are those services even existing?

- Competition among agencies/service providers

- Federal State – State – Province - Municipality

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Hierarchy

Who has power ?

– to call in for meetings

– to make decisions

– to provide resources (TIME)

– ...

Generic/Primary Prevention

Often underestimated

Relationship and trust

- Starting BEFORE something happens -> Stigmatisation

- How you name it – How focused you see it

- Involvement of Non State Actors (NPO/NGO/ Civil Society)

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Indicated/Secondary Prevention

- **Stigmatisation** of certain groups within society

- **Reliable Partners** in communities

- **Diverse Interest** (family members, network partners, communities, politics)

- **Justification** of resources and/or special arrangements

Challenges

Health vs Crime vs Extremism vs … (Prevention)

Political involvement and understanding „Quick Wins"

Performative Society :

- Key words necessary for funding are obstacles in practise
- Size Matters (but in which way?)
- „Evidence Based"

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Challenges

e.g. Citizenship Education - Democracy

- Values
- Human Rights
- Attitudes
- Behaviour

- Who dares to touch it (properly)?

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Thanks!

Annemieke Brons

Dutch National Police Unit The Hague

Anissa Akhandaf

Project Manager Prevention Violent Extremism City of Antwerp (BE)

CITY APPROACH ON PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM ANTWERP - BELGIUM

Antwerp city
Anissa Akhandaf
**MAY 2019**
For RAN

GOALS OF PVE ANTWERP

Actions =

1. Re-inclusion of radicalising youngsters by restoring & reinforcing ties to society

   = individual approach

2. Raising awareness & resilience among a great many organisations & institutions (ngo's & schools etc….)

   = group focused approach

PRINCIPLES OF PVE ANTWERP

1. Maximum use of regular, existing aid via social welfare institutions/organisations

2. Maximum engaging free and volunteer collaboration of the case-individual (-18 & +18)

3. Transparancy

4. Multidisciplinary approach via LIVC (local integral security cell) : STRONG START yet still improvement margin

TEAM PVE
ON THE EDGE BETWEEN SOCIAL AND SECURITY POLICY

Security policy :
Violent extremism

LOCAL INTEGRAL SECURITY CELL

Precise social intervention
groups of risk **(individual)** :
mediation, drug abuse, family
violence, without shelter, etc…),
PVE…

Team PVE : 2 fte's

**Raising awareness and resilience : informing,
training, support of projects,,….**

**Projectleader : 1 fte +
programleader : 1 fte**

**Regular policy : diminishing influences and nutrient media & reinforcing
social cohesion & fighting polarisation**

PARTNERS

BIGGEST CHALLENGES

1. BALANCE SOCIAL & SECURITY

BALANCE BETWEEN "COVERAGE PHILOSOPHY" and "CAREFUL WITH PUSHING YOUNGSTERS INTO A JUDICIARY TRAP"

2. MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF THE ART

1. Law = frame, but bottom up approach enhances mutual trust more:
2. Agreement of sharing needed information i.f.o. COMMON goal
3. Weighing in advance which cases should be channeled to the LISC (risk taxation)
4. Risk of sharing information out of a kind of "coverage philosophy" (fear induced)

Judy Korn

Founder Violence Prevention Network/ co-chair
RAN Exit

Second Wave "My City Real World" in Gouda

Video on project on trustbuilding between

local police and youngsters

https://youtu.be/6NTThMO2ufo

Contact

RAN CoE

Veemarkt 83
NL – 1019 DB Amsterdam
+31 20 463 50 50

RAN@radareurope.nl

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/index_en.htm